This descent consists of 3 pages.
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Series.

10/31

SECRET

**COLUMNIA** 

The Reportery

William R. Elliott

Sufa Supplie

Outlook

In previous memorands I have ventured to suggest the imposition of a blackade at the earliest moment that we had concrete evidence of Russian importation of arms and personnel to Cuba.

I am source of the considerations that probably motivated the handling of the matter in the way it was subsequently handled. The impact of the President's spaceh was electrifying and very reassuring. There was no question that he had the necessary support from this country and, eddly enough, from some people from whem we might not have expected it, such as the Canadians, including, as for as one could see, all important segments of Canadian opinion, in spite of Cyrus Eatom's influence which is gratifing there.

Unfortunately, he rapidly lost the support, if he ever had is, of those people the always think that talk is better than entron, and that the sole object of negotiations is to avoid any risks rather than doing that his speech indicated - taking risks to avoid the supreme risk.

The New York Times of last Sunday was almost devoted to that I suspect was, as usual, a British line since the Times is generally so oriented: I refer to what I would wenture to call the preposed Turkish sellout - one of the most dangerous generates in Enrumentary's game of chees. This was fortunately very well handled by the Administration.

Mr. Friendly in the Mashington Post was postifical but fr' mily in the way that one should resember in terms of the Italian proverb - "God protect us from our friends - we can take care of our ensaiss of resemble to be well up in his interesting last personagh or two on the mote of "by all means conceds ecough to take Karuschev off the hock and avoid putting him in an embarrassing or dangerous position in Russia". This and other stock Lippann themes appeared to be very such in the wings sawng those who have always fall that the kind of forthright confrontation that the President shall the things and that a series of "concessions" would not do set the fall that they wonld by "mashing the fall they say "at all costs keep talking". "There is a time for all their the Bible".

SWEET DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDO/MB

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#### SECTOR

I would like to put in a pairoid vay a few observations which I would see spelled out:

- 1. The first is that to depend solely on the United Matiens for dealing with Castre and for verifying the reseval of Sevist missile beseg sould be bed enough even if we had insisted, as we did not in the archanges under public, on begging this inspection on indefinitely as long as there was a Russian in Cuba or a Russian ship techning there. Otherwise, the well known capabilities for hiding warheads and nuclear missiles in a territory as west as Cuba remain open and can hardly be expected not to be utilized by an enemy who has presticed deception with the most incredible and open regularity. The latest instance is, of course, a sufficient witness.
- 2. To give an unqualified (or to allow Kuruschev to interpret as unqualified) assurance that we will not "attack" or "invade" Cubs without making it clear that we will always resort to measures of self defence against anyone who violates the agreements for the withdrawal of any furn of long range capabilities employing muclear weapons, including submarine bases, would appear to be capable of dangerous abuse by its possibilities of erecting a safe havon from which Cubs may exercise whatever forms of aggression are not capable of being dealt with through U. N. action. These forms would include direct action as the sabetuge of large facilities in Venezuela and the less recent "directed plot" to everture that Government, which I would have called a direct aggression.

It would seem to an necessary to make absolutely certain that this is a clear policy of this Government and the pontifical advice of Mr. Murray Marcier in this Merning's Pest that "by cyting for tension-reduction, Mashington can help set the reste for Messau" will be rejected in favor of not permitting "this tone" to less the entire substance of what the President had wen by his speech and immediate action programs, correllly limited to deal with the immediate realisies of the situation.

3. A crucial test of what we intend to do in the future that will set the whole tess of whather we clide back or move forward in densiting with control was, of course; the refusal to argue about giving up the limit like the some more crucial positive test will be the continuation of the himself the overflights and all other necessary intelligence presented to intelligence what is actually being done behind the present dangerous which met pormissible cleak of delay and secrecy which Gastre is arecting.

SECRET

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### SECRET

he Balene stre country secreta to Mr. Keruschev's bland ascentian the his may secured a complete guarantee of Castro immunity true the use of erned forces necessary for our self defense, and so avoid a centimed delay and deception that takes the entire force out of the President's position, we shall be confronted with Mr. Castro's professing that no one can tell him what to do when he doesn't want to do it and that Moscov's pladges were not binding on him. In that case, I should think the United States might demand either that the United Nations enforce the agreement on Castro or take action in its own self defense to do so if the United Mations is in default. To held Moscow responsible for Castro's acts has attractions but dangerous ambiguities.

I am owere that the atmosphere is charged with all sorts of petentialities. On the evidence the greatest petential danger is that we shall continue to repeat the errors of not facing this type of taction by continued pressure and villiproces to act. Whenever we have shown that villingness to act on sound grounds not vital to the basic survival of the Seviet system, we have never failed to get both the backing of the people of the United States and its allies and the backdown of Muscow confronted with action - not words. The greatest danger that exists to that could lead really to war or to our surrender is the danger that Kiruschev may come to believe that we vill not under any circumstances really risk war if he gives us a plausible way to substitute words for action and thus permit him to finesse a retention of his gains or a sizeable improvement of his position on the cheseboard.

Addressed to you from me simply as a citizen of the United States, I should not have had to classify these remarks. If my making them to you as a Consultant is embarrassing, I should be glad to resume my freedom as a citizen. This country never needed unity more. I felt with the President's really Wenderful speech that we were well on the ros d to achieving not only that unity but a sense of moral security and fortitude which must always be its base. The President's face was an inswiring premise of the kind of leadership which he has shown himself capable of giving this nation. I pray that we will not less this advantage through any efforts to please these people whose past sovice ought to be weighed in terms of its possible.

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William Y. Elliott

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cc: Mr. George McChes

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# **EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

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MUCIACO TEL

To:

The Secretary

From:

Willies Y. Elliott

Subject:

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SANITIZED VERSION (NIK-73-56)

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The Secretary - 2

October 31, 1962

I would like to put in a guarded way a few observations which I think do not need to be spelled out:

- 1. The first is that to depend solely on the United Nations for dealing with Castro and for verifying the removal of Soviet missile bases would be bad enough even if we had insisted, as we did not in the enclanges made public, on keeping this inspection on indefinitely as long as there was a Russian in Cuba or a Russian ship touching there. Otherwise, the well known capabilities for hiding warheads and nuclear missiles in a territory as wast as Cuba remain open and can hardly be expected not to be utilized by an energy who has practiced deception with the cost incredible and open regularity. The latest instance is, of course, a sufficient witness.
- 2. To give an unpulified (or to allow Muruschev to interpret as unpulified) assurance that we will not "attack" or "invade" Cuba without taking it clear that we will always report to recovers of welf defence against anyone who violates the agreements for the withdrawal of any form of long range capabilities employing unclear weapons, including submerine bases, would appear to be capable of dangerous abuse by its possibilities of erecting a safe haven from which Cuba may exercise whatever forms of aggression are not capable of being dealt with through U. M. action. These forms would include direct action as the sabotage of large facilities in Venezuela and the less recent "directed plot" to overturn that Covernment, which I would have called a direct aggression.

It would seem to me necessary to make absolutely certain that this is a clear policy of this Covernment and the production raises of the Manuy Markington can help set the route for Markington of not permitting "this tone" to lose the entire substance of what the President had won by his speech and immediate action programs, carefully limited to deal with the immediate realities of the situation.

3. A crucial test of what we intend to do in the future that will set the whole tone of whether we clida back or move forward in dealing with Castro was, of course, the refusal to argue about giving up the base. But an even more crucial positive test will be the continuation of the blockade and the overflights and all other necessary intelligence procedures to determine what is actually being done behind the present dengerous and, I think, not permissible clock of delay and accreay which Castro is creating.

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## The Secretary . 3

4. Unless this country responds to Mr. Khruschev's bland ensumption that he has now secured a complete guarantee of Castro irramity from any use of erred forces necessary for our self defense, and so avoid a continued delay and deseption that takes the entire force out of the President's position, we shall be confronted with Mr. Controls professing that no one can tell him what to do when he desan't mant to do it and that Moscow's pledges were not binding on him. In that case, I brould think the United States which do and either that the United Nations enforce the agreement on Cestro or take action in its own self defense to do so if the United Nations is is default. To hold Hoscow responsible for Castro's sets has attractions but dengarous ambiguities.

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William Y. Elliott

cc: Mr. George McChee

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